We show that in microdata, as well as in a search and matching model with ‡exible wages for new hires, wage rigidities of incumbent workers have substantial e¤ects on separations and unemployment volatility. Allowing for an empirically relevant degree of wage rigidities for incumbent workers drives unemployment volatility, as well as the volatility of vacancies and tightness to that in the data. Thus, the degree of wage rigidity for newly hired workers is not a su¢ cient statistic for determining the e¤ect of wage rigidities on macroeconomic outcomes. This …nding a¤ects the interpretation of a large empirical literature on wage rigidities.
Introduction
In a recent very in ‡uential paper, Pissarides (2009) showed that in the baseline search and matching model job creation, and hence unemployment volatility, is only a¤ected by wage setting in new matches. This is important, since it points to the degree of wage rigidity of new hires as the key statistic determining labor-market dynamics as opposed to wage rigidities in general. 1 Naturally, this insight spurred a growing empirical literature studying wage setting for new hires (see e.g. Carneiro, Guimarães and Portugal, 2012 , Gertler, Trigari and Huckfeldt, 2016 , Haefke, Sonntag and van Rens, 2013 and Martins, Thomas and Solon, 2012 . Pissarides (2009) analyzes the case with exogenous separations, a route supported by the in ‡uential …nding of Shimer (2007 Shimer ( , 2012 ) that separations contribute very little to unemployment ‡uctuations.
However, recent work by Barnichon (2012) show that this result hinges crucially on the assumption that the job …nding and the job separation rates are two independent determinants of unemployment.
Relaxing this assumption increases the role of separations in unemployment volatility substantially to about 40 percent of unemployment's variance; see also Fujita and Ramey (2009) , Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009) for additional evidence of the importance of the separations margin in understanding unemployment volatility. In light of this …nding, we take a step back in this paper and study the role of wage rigidities for incumbent workers in a search and matching model with endogenous separations as in e.g. Pissarides (1994) , where wages of new hires are fully ‡exible. We begin by showing that wage rigidities of incumbent workers are important for separations and hence employment volatility in a simple partial equilibrium setup. Intuitively, a positive shock to productivity increases all wages that can be adjusted, but with wage frictions some wages in existing matches are unchanged leading to a decrease in separations. Then, since the incumbent wage a¤ects job separations, employment is a¤ected. Thus, to only focus on wage setting for new hires is not enough in this framework in order to fully capture the link between wage-setting rigidities and unemployment volatility.
To provide evidence on the link between separations and incumbent wages, we rely on linked Swedish employer-employee microdata. We show theoretically that if incumbent workers' wages are ‡exible there should be no relationship between the …rm wage and separations conditional on the marginal revenue product of the …rm and the workers'outside option. In contrast, the data give stark evidence for a strong positive conditional relationship as expected when incumbent worker wages are rigid. This …nding is thus in line with the literature studying the cyclicality of wages documenting wage rigidities in incumbents'wages; see Pissarides (2009) for an overview of this large literature. In a similar vein, Schmeider and Von Wachter (2010) provide evidence that workers with higher wages due to past favorable labor market conditions face higher risk of job loss in U.S. data. Earlier work by Card (1990) also points to that preset wages have an allocative e¤ect.
Since general equilibrium feedback e¤ects may overturn partial equilibrium intuition, we proceed by introducing endogenous separations in combination with rigid wages for incumbent workers in a DSGE model. In this setup, we …nd that an empirically relevant degree of wage rigidities for incumbent workers has large quantitative e¤ects on unemployment volatility even when wages for new hires are fully ‡exible, producing a standard deviation of unemployment that matches the standard deviation in the data. Importantly, the model also matches the quantitative microdata evidence on the conditional …rm-level wage elasticity of separations without this moment being targeted in the model calibration.
In contrast, if we turn o¤ the wage rigidity -making all wages ‡exible -unemployment volatility drops signi…cantly indicating that wage rigidities for incumbent workers provide a substantial propagation force. Thus, as a corollary to these …ndings, the degree of wage rigidity for newly hired workers is not a su¢ cient statistic for determining the e¤ect of wage rigidities on macroeconomic outcomes. Instead, wage frictions for incumbent workers turn out to have large e¤ects on employment volatility, despite wages for new hires being ‡exible. This …nding, in turn, a¤ects the interpretation of a large empirical literature on wage rigidities; see Pissarides (2009) for a summary.
Three related papers are Bils, Chang, and Kim (2016) , Schoefer (2015) and Fujita and Ramey (2012) . Bils, Chang, and Kim (2016) argue that endogenous e¤ort can break the neutrality result of wages for existing workers. Even though wages for new hires are ‡exible, future e¤ort choices are a¤ected by wage frictions, in turn a¤ecting job creation and employment. However, to achieve a signi…cant di¤erence vis-à-vis a model with fully ‡exible wages, equilibrium e¤ort needs to depend not only on the individual worker's wage, but also on the wage of all workers in the …rm, which in turn equalizes the e¤ort level across all workers in the …rm. In Schoefer (2015) , there is a …nancial friction in the form of a requirement on …rms to use internal funds when hiring workers. Wage rigidities then make …rm internal funds vary substantially with shocks, in turn leading to a large volatility in hiring and employment. In both papers, any e¤ects of wage frictions on unemployment volatility work through the hiring margin, though. Fujita and Ramey (2012) analyses a model with endogenous separations and on-the-job search with ‡exible wages for all workers. Their calibrated model generates countercyclical separations and an unemployment volatility that is more in line with the data than that generated by the classical search and matching model, albeit still on the low side. We show that introducing wage frictions for incumbent wages brings the model much closer in matching the data moments, especially for unemployment, vacancies and tightness. Also, with ‡exible wages for all workers the model predicts a zero conditional …rm-level wage elasticity of separations, which is, again, clearly rejected by the microdata. This paper is outlined as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic mechanism we have in mind, in Section 3 we present microdata evidence supporting that incumbent wage stickiness a¤ect separations, in Section 4 we outline the framework for the quantitative evaluation and in Section 5 we present the calibration and the quantitative results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The Mechanism
To set ideas, it is helpful to …rst focus on a stylized model of the labor market with search and matching frictions captured by a constant returns matching function and where wages are determined by the Nash-Bargaining solution. Moreover, separations are endogenous and the …rm can close jobs at no cost as along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) . Thus, an idiosyncratic productivity shock a jt is drawn in each …rm j at each period t, following the cdf G. The …rm decides on a cuto¤ level of idiosyncratic productivity, denoted R jt , where the …rm is indi¤erent between terminating the match and keeping the worker. Firm marginal revenue product, given the idiosyncratic productivity shock,
where p jt is the price of the …rm's output and z t an aggregate productivity shock.
Flexible Wages
We denote the surplus of the …rm (worker) when wages change by J jt (H jt ). Letting w jt (a jt ) denote the rebargained wage, the expected …rm value is
where is the discount factor and is the …xed probability that the match survives into the next period, capturing an exogenous component of separations (i.e. voluntary quits). When the …rm has the right to manage, the …rm choose separations (i.e. the cuto¤ productivities R jt ) so that J jt (R jt ) = 0.
Similarly, the surplus for the worker when wages change is
where b is the ‡ow payo¤ of the worker when unemployed, s the probability of …nding a job and H e t the average value of being employed across all …rms in the economy.
Wages are determined in bargaining and are given by the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS)
Note that, removing the …rm's right to manage and instead assuming that separations are also bargained over, the separation cuto¤ is determined so that the total surplus S jt = J jt + H jt is zero, i.e. S jt (R jt ) = 0. Since J jt = (1 ') S jt , the solution is the same as under right to manage; see also Fujita and Ramey (2012) . Moreover, wages do not a¤ect separations in equilibrium, since wages just redistribute surplus between the …rm and the worker. We have
which does not depend on wages, but only on (the current and future through S jt+1 and S e t+1 ) outside option of the worker and the marginal revenue product of the …rm.
Wage Frictions
+ (1 )
where is the probability that wages are adjusted andĴ jt+1 (r;ŵ jt ) the surplus of the …rm when wages are …xed atŵ jt . Also, for …rms where the wage is …xed atŵ jt , noting thatŵ jt is a state variable,
Firms choose separations (i.e. the cuto¤ productivities R jt andR jt (ŵ jt )) so that
When wages are not rebargained,Ĥ jt (a jt ;ŵ jt ) is de…ned along the lines of (10) withŵ jt replacing w jt (a jt ). In case wages are renegotiated, they are again given by the NBS (4).
If wages are sticky, the wage will have allocative e¤ects through separations, in contrast to when wages are ‡exible as in (5). For workers that don't rebargain their wage, the separation cuto¤R jt is determined so thatĴ jt R jt (ŵ jt ) ;ŵ jt = 0, which implies that
Assuming that dĴ jt+1 (r;ŵ jt ) dŵ jt < 0, we get dR jt =dŵ jt > 0 and thus that separations increase in the wage.
Notice that this derivative is conditional on holding the marginal revenue product of the …rm as well as the outside option of the worker constant.
While the model above only has single worker …rms, it can be recast in a model where …rms are large, given that …rms have a constant returns technology. For incumbent workers, some wages are renegotiated and some are not and separations are given by (8) and (9), respectively. For new hires, on the other hand, all wages are negotiated at entry and the separation decision is given by (8). Thus, rigid wages a¤ect separations for incumbent workers.
Are Separations Driven by Sticky Incumbent Wages?
To test which model of wage setting is best aligned with microdata, we rely on equations (5) and (11) and impose a log-linear technology (Cobb-Douglas) to account for the fact that most …rms have many employees. We also assume that the variation in the outside option is common across workers in the same sector and time period and can thus be captured by the interaction of time and sector dummies, denoted st . 2 We then estimate the following regression using IV-techniques First, the …rm …xed e¤ect will remove all di¤erences between …rms on average and the sector by time …xed e¤ects will remove all common variation in the data due to e.g. aggregate or sectoral shocks.
Thus, the identi…cation of w will come from purely idiosyncratic …rm-level variation, which is what we need for our empirical test of the model predictions. Note also that including the interaction of time and sector dummies will handle the de ‡ation of the variables and we therefore rely on nominal measures of the …rm-level marginal revenue product and the wage in the speci…cation (12).
Second, to handle simultaneity and potential measurement errors we need instruments correlated with ln mrp jt and ln w jt -to provide independent variation vis-à-vis the outside option of the workers -captured by time by sector dummies, but uncorrelated with any idiosyncratic shocks simultaneously driving ln sep jt . Naturally, these restrictions leave a very small set of potential instruments. However, as shown by Fujita and Ramey (2012) and echoed in our own …ndings reported below, matching a model with endogenous separations to the data requires idiosyncratic shocks that are, for all practical purposes, to be regarded as i.i.d. on the annual frequency (see Section 5 below for a discussion). This result opens up for plausibly using lagged information when constructing instruments. Importantly, even with non-persistent idiosyncratic shocks, wage stickiness, as included in the model, still gives rise to a positive correlation of wages over time through (sometimes) unchanged wages for incumbent workers. We can use this for identi…cation. Similarly, although not explicitly modeled, the presence of price stickiness in the data (as reported by Carlsson and Nordström Skans, 2012) generates a positive correlation of the marginal revenue product over time, which also can be used for identi…cation. 4 Moreover, from the model above, idiosyncratic technology shocks that drive down separations would also drive up the wage. Thus, autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic technology shocks and the use of instruments based on lagged information would bias us towards …nding a negative sign on the key parameter of interest in this exercise, w . In this sense, the positive estimate of w presented below is 3 Future values a¤ect today's separations and we have common autocorrelated shocks in the model outlined below. Note, however, that this common variation in future values will be captured by the time dummies. 4 In Appendix A, we present results from the …rst-stage regressions with signs that are in line with these predictions.
to be regarded as a lower bound. In Appendix A we show that this result is robust, with only mildly increasing point estimates of w when using higher order lags of the instruments, which should further alleviate any potential bias from autocorrelated idiosyncratic shocks.
Third, the model predicts that there should only be an e¤ect of incumbent workers wages on separations in the case incumbents wages are sticky. Note that if incumbent workers wages are sticky, it is possible to think of stories where new-hires wages could also be a¤ected by the lagged wage of incumbents through new hires wages beeing tied to incumbent workers wages in a rigid wage structure within the …rm. Although the degree of ‡exibility of new hires wages is the subject of intense debate (see e.g. Carneiro, Guimarães and Portugal, 2012 , Gertler, Trigari and Huckfeldt, 2016 , Haefke, Sonntag and van Rens, 2013 , Martins, Thomas and Solon, 2012 and Pissarides, 2009 ), from the model outlined above it is clear that this indirect e¤ect would impose a negative force on w since higher incumbent wages, ceteris paribus, also lower the incentive to create new jobs and thus mitigate the incentives to substitute away from incumbent workers. This again would be a reason for viewing the positive estimate for w as a lower bound.
Fourth, to compute separations we rely on the Register Based Labor Markets Statistics (RAMS)
collected by the Swedish Tax Authority for tax reasons and containing individual worker information on annual total labor income by employment spell (measured as start and end month) by each …rm (see Section 3.1 below for a more detailed discussion of the data). The RAMS data set does not contain any information on the intensive labor-input margin in this data. Conceptually, we want to think of workers with at least some degree of attachment to the …rm when studying wage e¤ects on the …rm-level separations margin, but it is not obvious where to draw the line. Below, we discuss in detail what we do to mitigate this problem by using a cut-o¤ for the individual monthly wage (calculated by dividing annual labor income by the employment spell length in months), but regardless of what exactly we do, we should acknowledge that there will be measurement errors in the separations variable.
The existence of measurement errors in the left hand side variable in the regression is not a serious issue per se since it only a¤ects the precision of the estimates. However, using the wage measure from the RAMS data to compute a …rm-level wage as the average monthly wage across all workers within the …rm is more problematic. First, lacking data on the intensive labor-input margin makes the metric for this measure unclear. Also, separations from weakly attached workers with a low measured monthly wage causes the RAMS measure of the …rm-level wage to rise mechanically. Moreover, via the ‡ow equation of employment, i.e. n jt = n jt 1 + hires jt sep jt , we arrive at a version of the classic division-bias problem. The dynamic nature of the same ‡ow equation also renders the use of a lag of the RAMS measure of the …rm-level wage as an instrument for the current value of the same measure questionable. Fortunately, we have access to a completely separate measure of …rm-level wages from the database Företagens Ekonomi (FEK), which is based on a …rm-level survey maintained by Statistics Sweden. From this source we can compute a …rm-level wage as the wage sum paid by the …rm divided by the number of full time equivalent employes. First, this gives us a wage metric that handles the intensive margin to be used as the dependent variable. Second, this measure will not be subject to the problematic dependencies between the measures of separations and …rm-level wages discussed above. We will also use this data source when computing our measure of the …rm-level marginal revenue product used both as an independent variable and as an instrument when lagged.
Fifth, there may be true systematic sorting of workers into separations that may give rise to a nonzero w even under ‡exible wages for incumbents. If the separation probability of a worker is related to the wage ranking of the workers within the …rm, the …rm-level wage would move when workers separate. This issue prevents us from using the lagged …rm-level wage from the FEK data as an instrument. Instead, to handle such sorting e¤ects on the estimate of w we construct an instrument for the …rm-level wage that controls for the composition of workers within the …rm. Speci…cally, we estimate the following regression on RAMS data in a …rst step
where ln w ijt is the wage for a worker i in …rm j in time t, ij is a match-speci…c e¤ect, ln w cc jt is …rm speci…c time …xed e¤ects. The estimate lnŵ cc jt is then a measure of the …rm-level wage controlling for the composition of the workers in the …rm. 5 We will use the lag of this measure as an instrument and thus rely on covariation in the incumbent workers'wages over time via wage stickiness for identi…cation of w while controlling for any sorting e¤ects on the same parameter. 6;7 Finally, many …rms are small and to conserve on the data and not throw out all zero observations on separations we will use the approximation sep jt =sep j , where sep j denotes the …rm average of separations, instead of ln sep jt , as the dependent variable in the speci…cation (12). 8 In the Appendix A we evaluate this approximation and show that it performs well on an overlapping sample.
5 The composition cleaned …rm-level wage, lnŵ cc jt , is identi…ed up to …rm-speci…c constant, which in turn, is estimated in the second step where the (lag of the) measure is used as an instrument. Also, lnŵ cc jt is an estimated measure, but since it will be used as an instrument (and not a regressor) this will not a¤ect the inference; see Wooldridge (2002) . 6 Note that the IV-procedure would break down already in the …rst stage if there is no wage stickiness for incumbent workers in the data. 7 Removing the match-speci…c …xed e¤ects is an alternative way to address the problematic dependencies between the measures of separations and …rm-level wages discussed above. But since it is still less clear how to think of the wage metric in the composition cleaned …rm-level wage derived from the RAMS data, we use it to form an instrument and use the …rm-level wage from the FEK data, where the wage metric is clear (full time wage), as the explanatory variable.
8 Note that in (12),
, where the latter expression is estimated when the approximation is used.
Microdata
As discussed above, the …rm-level microdata we use to estimate equation (12) are drawn from two sources. First, we use annual information from the survey/register FEK database maintained by Statistics Sweden, on value added, labor costs, the number of employees (in terms of full-time equivalents) and a …ve-digit (NACE) sector code for all employing non-…nancial Swedish …rms in the private sector from 1997 to 2011, which is the last year we have access to. We then compute mrp jt as nominal value added (p jt y jt ) divided by the number of full-time equivalent workers (l jt ). To obtain a measure of the …rm wage we divide total …rm-level nominal labor costs (wagebill jt ) by the number of full-time equivalent workers. 9 Thus the FEK data gives us a proper measure of the average …rm-level, full-time wage since the labor input measure accounts for both the extensive and intensive labor-input margin.
Second, to compute separations we use the RAMS database. This database is also maintained by Statistics Sweden and contains information about labor earnings for all employment spells in the Swedish private sector as well as a plant and a …rm identi…er. The plant and …rm identi…ers enable us to match the individual employment spells to the employing …rm in the FEK database. Importantly, the RAMS database is based on a completely separate data source than the FEK database, so there is no scope for overlapping measurement errors in the two databases. Speci…cally, the raw data for the RAMS database is collected from employers by the Swedish Tax Authority in order to calculate taxes. Data include information on annual earnings, as well as the …rst and last remunerated month in the year. Using this information, we can construct a …rm measure of separations. Here, separations are de…ned in the same way as they enter into the ‡ow equation of employment, i.e. n jt = n jt 1 + hires jt sep jt . The baseline de…nition of separations we employ is based on the primary employment of full-time workers. The RAMS data lacks information on actual hours, so to restrict attention to workers that are reasonably close to full time workers we only consider a person to be a full-time employee if the (monthly) wage exceeds 75 percent of the mean (monthly) wage of janitors employed by municipalities. Also, since we are aiming to identify full-time workers we only count an individual as employed by at most one …rm each year by only keeping the employment with the highest wage in November (which is the reference month used by Statistics Sweden). In other words, with this de…nition we focus on individual's primary employment. 10 Self-employed workers are not counted as employed in any of the de…nitions of separations used in the paper.
Third, using the same RAMS data on individual's primary employment, we compute the compo-sition cleaned …rm-level wage ln w cc jt by estimating equation (13). Fourth, note that the RAMS database contains geographical information on the plant where the worker is employed. Using this information we can also experiment by including controls for regional variation in the workers'outside option. Thus, we can include the triple interaction of time, two-digit (NACE) sector and county (NUTS3) as a control for the workers'outside option.
Putting everything together, we end up with a sample of 175; 459 …rms and 1; 147; 875 …rm/year observations for which we can compile all the information we need for estimating the baseline IVspeci…cation.
Finally, two additional complications arise from the fact that many …rms are small and there are many instances of zero separations (about 41 percent of the data). To handle very large swings in separations and to acknowledge that ln w cc jt is estimated as an average across workers within a …rm/year, we …rst require that the …rms have at least 10 full-time employees for a …rm/year observation to be included (according to the strict de…nition used to compute separations in the RAMS data), leaving a sample of 52; 653 …rms and 316; 903 …rm/year observations. Secondly, to conserve on the data and not throw out all zero observations on separations we use the approximation sep jt =sep j , as discussed above, instead of ln sep jt , as the dependent variable in the regression (12). However, even with this approximation we need to drop …rms with a zero …rm average of separations. Thus, all in all, the baseline estimation sample amounts to 49; 824 …rms and 313; 383 …rm/year observations. For this sample, we control for outside options by using 814 sector by time dummies (when using sector by time by county dummies to control for outside options, we use 12; 741 dummies). 11 Note that the sample size information in the tables below is adjusted for removing singletons in the estimation.
Microdata Results
As can be seen in the …rst column of Table 1 , IV estimation yields a statistically signi…cant estimate of the conditional …rm-level wage elasticity of separations, w , equal to 6:029 (…rm-level clustered s.e. 0:309), thus rejecting the null of ‡exible incumbent wages with a sign consistent with the presence of wage frictions in the data. Moreover, the negative sign of the coe¢ cient for the estimated conditional …rm-level marginal revenue product elasticity of separations, mrp ( 2:261, s.e. 0:173), is also in line with what is expected from the model. As reported in Appendix A, the instruments are highly relevant with F-statistics of 589 and 437, in respective …rst-stage regression. 12 From column (2) we see that allowing for geographical variation, over and above sector time variation, in the workers' outside option does not change the results quantitatively. Speci…cally, 1 1 Estimation is performed using the reghdfe routine for Stata; see Correia (2014) . 1 2 Also, a formal under-identi…cation test con…rms that the IV speci…cation is well identi…ed (Kleibergen and Paap (2006) 
rk LM statistic:
2 (1) = 465, p-val = 0:000) including the triple interaction of sector (NACE two-digit) by time by county yields similar results as to relying on only the interaction of sector (NACE two-digit) by time. Note that the number of observations falls a bit when also allowing for geographical variation in the reservation wage since we loose …rms with multi-county activity in this version of the regression.
In column (3) we show that dropping years a¤ected by the …nancial crisis (2008-2011) yields very similar results, quantitatively.
In Appendix A we also show that the results are also robust to: (i) employing a loose measure of …rm-level separations in the regression, relying on all employment spells of all workers regardless of their degree of …rm attachment when calculating separations, (ii) looking at larger …rms (iii) focusing on the manufacturing sector only, and (iv) lagging the instrument set further backwards in time. Overall, the point estimates of the conditional …rm-level wage elasticity of separations are all statistically signi…cant and lie between 5:067 and 8:333 across all the exercises in the paper, implying a back of the envelope 95-percent con…dence interval of 4:542 and 9:846. Thus, all in all, we conclude from this exercise that the microdata strongly and robustly rejects a ‡exible incumbent wage model, and instead favours the hypothesis that incumbent wages do a¤ect separations and that wages thereby are being allocative. This …nding is also in line with the literature studying the cyclicality of wages documenting wage rigidities in incumbents'wages; see Pissarides (2009) for an overview of this large literature. In a similar vein, Schmeider and Von Wachter (2010) provide evidence that workers with higher wages due to past favorable labor market conditions face higher risk of job loss in U.S. data.
Earlier work by Card (1990) also provide evidence of that preset wages have an allocative e¤ect.
Note that there is a large literature, surveyed in Manning (2011) , that seeks to infer the elasticity of labor supply by looking at how sensitive …rm recruitment is to wages. Since recruitment is equal to the negative of separations for a …rm with constant employment, this is in a number of studies indirectly measured by the separation elasticity with respect to wages. Since this strand of the literature tries to estimate the labor supply elasticity, i.e., movements along the labor supply curve, the relationship between wages and separations is found to be negative. Note that the exercise in this paper is very di¤erent. We seek to identify a mechanism that acts via …rms labor demand by estimating the e¤ect of variations in incumbents'wages on separations, conditional on the marginal revenue product of the …rm and the workers'outside option. Naturally, the e¤ect of wages on separations working through the …rm's labor demand is positive.
A Model for Quantitative Evaluation
The next step in our analysis attempts to realistically evaluate the macroeconomic quantitative importance of the mechanism outlined above by embedding it in a standard Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model. Since we are not interested in studying nominal variables per se, we treat prices as ‡exible and normalize the price p jt in (6) to unity in every period. This provides a framework for the quantitative evaluation that shares many elements of standard real models.
In the model, …rms use labor to produce output and post vacancies on a search and matching labor market. Wages are bargained between workers and …rms in a setting with stochastic impediments to rebargaining, akin to Calvo (1983) . New hires, however, always bargain their wage. On-the-job search is endogenous along the lines of Pissarides (1994) . 13 Unemployed workers receive unemployment bene…ts paid by the government that are …nanced via lump-sum taxes.
Firms
Firms each employ one worker to produce a homogenous good with a constant returns technology that is sold at unit price to retailers. Firm revenue is z t a t , where z t is an aggregate productivity shock and a t an idiosyncratic productivity shock. Note that for notational convenience we suppress the j index used in Section 2 on idiosyncratic productivity. The idiosyncratic shock is assumed to follow the cdf G with upper and lower bounds, a ub and a lb , respectively. As in the example in section 2, if idiosyncratic productivity is su¢ ciently low, the …rm will cease operations and lay o¤ the worker.
Search and Matching and the Hiring Decision
Letting u t denote unemployment, t vacancies and t the number of matched workers searching, the total number of searching workers is u t + t . Match formation is governed by the Cobb-Douglas matching function
Labor-market tightness is given by
Vacancies are determined as usual by the equalization of the vacancy cost, denoted c, of an employee and the expected value of the worker to the …rm. As in Pissarides (1994) , when workers enter a …rm, they enter at the highest idiosyncratic productivity a ub . Job creation is then given by
where is the discount factor, q ( t ) the probability of …lling a vacancy and J t the value of a …rm. A detailed description of employment ‡ows, which are somewhat involved, can be found in the Appendix B.1.
Value Functions
Let H s and H ns denote worker surplus when the worker searches and does not search on the job, respectively. We assume that workers face a cost of searching on the job. With probability , workers' idiosyncratic productivity changes and is again drawn from the distribution G and with probability (1 ) that the probability is unchanged. Note that the wage will depend on idiosyncratic productivity a t . Let w s (a t ) (w ns (a t )) denote the worker wages when searching (not searching). The expected net surplus for an employed worker in a …rm that resets the wage this period is
where I t is an indicator function that is equal to one of the worker searches on the job and zero otherwise, again surpressing the aggregate state variable z t : Moreover, b is the ‡ow payo¤ of the worker when unemployed, g ns = 0 and g s = f ( t ), ns = (1 s) and s = (1 f ( t )) (1 s), 
In case wages are not reset but remain at the levelŵ t from the previous period, the wageŵ t is a state variable and the surplus iŝ
For …rms that change wages, the surplus is, when there is no on-the-job search
where
In case wages are not reset but remain at the levelŵ t from the previous period, the values arê
Endogenous Separations and On-the-Job Search
As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), …rms have the right to manage. A …rm lays o¤ workers if idiosyncratic productivity is at most equal to a cuto¤ level R i andR i for i 2 fns; sg. The separation cuto¤s are
In order to get a Beveridge curve that is in line with empirical evidence, we add on the job search. 14 Similarly, the decisions for workers when to search on the job depend on the level of the idiosyncratic productivity shock. A worker searches on the job when idiosyncratic productivity is at most equal to a cuto¤ level R S andR S . The on-the-job search cuto¤s are
Note that the introduction of on the job search potentially blurs the channel between wages and separations. The simple model above predicts an unambiguous positive sign for the conditional …rm-level wage elasticity of separations, w , under the null of wage rigidity for incumbent workers. When allowing for on the job search the sign for w will depend on whether the ‡ow of separations is dominated by layo¤s or by non-random quits to other jobs (i.e. job switches driven by wage di¤erences).
Speci…cally, a high …rm-level wage, ceteris paribus, makes it less likely that you will accept a competing job-o¤er driving w towards a negative sign. We see however in the microdata that the layo¤ channel dominates. 15 Below, we also con…rm that this is the case in the calibrated model when calculating the implied conditional …rm-level wage elasticity of separations; for details see Section 5.3 below.
Wage Bargaining
The nominal wage, when wages are rebargained, is chosen such that it solves the Nash product
where i 2 fns; sg and ' denote the bargaining power of the family. 1 4 A model with only endogenous separations tends to yield a positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies; see Fujita and Ramey (2012) .
1 5 Survey evidence in line with this …nding suggests that a sizeable share of job quits are due to reasons unrelated to the wage. Speci…cally, in a survey "Svenskarnas vilja att byta jobb" from 2017 commissioned by TRR Trygghetsrådet and performed by Norstat on a random representative sample of Swedes between the ages 16 64, answered by 1; 010 individuals (when …rst screening out students, retirees and self employed), only 18 percent of those that changed job the last …ve years (47 percent of all respondents) states that this was due to beeing discontent with the wage. Another 20 percent stated that they got an o¤er they couldn't refuse which may or may not include an o¤er of a higher wage.
The Resource and Government Budget Constraints
Let n t (a) denote employment in …rms with idiosyncratic productivity a. The aggregate resource constraint can be written as
The government uses lump-sum taxes to …nance unemployment bene…ts. Thus, t = (1 n t ) b r .
Quantitative Evaluation
In the quantitative evaluation we have evaluated the performance of the full model both in a Swedish, as well as in a U.S. context. Although the Swedish labor market is considerably more rigid, with e.g.
quarterly ‡ows on par with U.S. monthly ‡ows, the two economies are similar in terms of standard dimensions for evaluating the performance of search and matching models. Moreover, since the full model yields very similar quantitative results in these dimension, regardless of which of the two countries'data moments to match the model to, we present the U.S. results in the main text and defer the Swedish results to the Appendix B.3.
Calibration
The baseline calibration of the structural parameters is presented in Table 2 and is based on standard values for a monthly parametrization. We set to 0:9966, which generates a real interest rate of around 4 percent. We take a standard approach in the calibration of the worker outside option b and set it to 0:75, which is in the span of the estimate in Gertler, Sala, and Trigari (2008) and the calculations in Hall and Milgrom (2008). 16; 17; 18 For job separations, we follow Fujita and Ramey (2012) and set total monthly separations to 0:1, implying a monthly rate of 0:02. We set the bargaining power ' = 0:5, implying symmetrical bargaining in the baseline calibration. We choose a to yield a matching function elasticity of 0:5 to ensure that the (basic) Hosios condition is satis…ed, following Pissarides (2009). As is commonly assumed, see e.g. Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) and Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010), we assume that the idiosyncratic productivity shock follows a log-normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation parameter G . We approximate the idiosyncratic distribution by a grid with 40 gridpoints with lower (upper) bound of 0:6 (1:1).
The Calvo parameter is set to 0:138, following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) . Their baseline quarterly estimate of the probability of a wage change is 0:36, implying a duration of wage contracts of slightly below three quarters. Given the U.S. microdata evidence presented in Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2014) of an overall probability of wage change in between 21:1 to 26:6 this parameter is calibrated conservatively and in the upper range of the empirically relevant region. 19 We follow Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) closely when calibrating the aggregate productivity process. We approximate, through a 5-state Markov chain, the continuous-valued AR (1) process Table 3 . 21 Comparing data moments (…rst column) with simulated moments from the model (second column), under the calibration in Table 2 , shows that the model …ts the data moments closely, overall. The only dimension where the model misses somewhat is that the 1 6 Here, b is the payo¤ when unemployed, thus including e.g. the value of leisure. 1 7 According to evidence cited in Hall and Milgrom (2008) the after-tax replacement rate is 36 percent. Since not all unemployed workers receive bene…ts, they set the rate to 25 percent. By adding the value of leisure and the di¤erence in consumption between employed and unemployed, they …nd a value of 0:71 for the payo¤ when unemployed. The OECD statistics points towards a somewhat higher number for the after-tax replacement rate, though. We therefore …nd a slightly higher calibration of the worker outside option reasonable.
1 8 The calibration of b is subject of intense debate, see e.g. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016). Here, the calibration is close to the middle of the interval of 0:47 to 0:96 presented by the latter.
1 9 An even stickier calibration could be motivated from the probability of a within-job wage change reported to be in between 16:3 and 21:6 percent per quarter in Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2014) .
2 0 The last …ve targeted moments are taken from Fujita and Ramey (2012) . 2 1 The number of months in the simulation is set so that it corresponds to the number of quarters in the quarterly data of Fujita and Ramey (2012) (where the period is 1976:I-2005:IV). When choosing the parameters , c, G, , and s, we simulate 100 data sets, aggregate to quarterly data and then compute the average labor market tightness, the separation the persistence of separations is a bit too low. This latter moment is tricky to match exactly in this class of models. For example, Fujita and Ramey (2012) also has problems in this dimension, but missing the target on the other side. The parameter that determines the degree of persistence in the idiosyncratic productivity process is 0:740. This implies a yearly probability of remaining in the same productivity state close to zero, which is very similar to the implied probability based on the estimation results presented in Fujita and Ramey (2012) . Importantly, there is thus a substantial leeway before the persistence in the idiosyncratic technology shock would give rise to any substantial bias in the IV-estimation procedure relying on annual data discussed above.
Solution Algorithm
We use nonlinear solution techniques along the lines of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) to solve the model. As with a standard search and matching model, the system can be solved recursively, i.e. …rst solving for labor market tightness, wages and values and then for employment ‡ows. Since the system (16), (17), (20), (21), (24) and (27) above does not depend directly on unemployment; we can solve without computing employment and unemployment. Wages that change today depend on the state variables, z t and a t . Similarly, a wage that is reset at some point t k in the past depend on the state variables, z t k and a t k . The state for worker and …rm surpluses when wages are rigid then depends on the current states, z t and a t , and the states when the wage was last reset. Letting Z denote the state space for z t and A the state space for a t , the state space for J i and H i is Z A and the state space forĴ i andĤ i is Z A Z A.
Given the rede…nition of the state space above, we guess a solution for …rm and worker surpluses, wages and labor market tightness and compute new revised values using value function iteration until convergence. The model is then simulated to generate the synthetic variables required to compute the moments that we match in the calibration.
rate, the job-to-job …nding rate, the job …nding rate, separation persistence and separation standard deviation.
Validation
As a …rst exercise on the calibrated model we compare the implied non targeted conditional …rm-level wage elasticity of separations, w , to that of the microdata. For this we calculate the wage elasticity of separations by use of the change in separations from moving in the grid of past wages averaging over Calvo draws, thus holding the idiosyncratic-and the aggregate technology constant in the computation. 22 Then the elasticity computed at each grid point is weighted by its employment share in each time period. Finally, to average out di¤erent draws of the aggregate technology shock process, we take the average of the elasticity over 100 simulations.
The model under the Swedish calibration, described in detail in the Appendix B.3, gives a conditional …rm-level wage elasticity of separations of 8:22, which is within the range of the microdata estimates. Remembering that there are reasons to believe that the point estimates are downward biased, as discussed in Section 3, there is thus a very high degree of agreement between the micro results and the model implications in this dimension. Calibrating the model in a U.S. context, as described above, yields a very similar conditional …rm-level wage elasticity of separations of 7:18.
Quantitative Results
For comparison with the non-targeted moments, we use quarterly data from Fujita and Ramey (2012) that cover the period 1976:Q1-2005:Q4. The implied data moments are presented in the top rows of the top and the bottom panel of Table 4 .
The simulated standard deviation for the unemployment rate, the job …nding rate, total separation rate, vacancies and the vacancy unemployment ratio are presented in the top panel of Table 4 .
Comparing the two top rows we see that wage rigidities for incumbent workers generate a standard deviation of unemployment in the model that is close to the level of the observed standard deviation in the data, 0:089 vs. 0:096. Importantly, the model also performs well in terms of matching the volatility of the vacancy rate, which has proven notoriously di¢ cult in the search-matching literature -a notable exception is Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) . The reason is that the surplus of the …rm from vacancy creation becomes much more sensitive to shocks when incumbent wages are rigid. Given the results for unemployment and vacancy volatility, it is not surprising that the model also performs well in terms of the volatility of tightness (v t =u t ) vis-à-vis the data. However, we do see that the 2 2 To see why this calculation corresponds to the IV results from the microdata and not the reduced-form estimates from directly including the instrument in the equation, note that we have two cases in the model. First, when the Calvo draw implies that the wage is …xed the lagged wage for incumbent workers perfectly explains the current wage, implying a …rst-stage coe¢ cient of unity and we thus identify the second-stage IV coe¢ cient in this case. Secondly, when the Calvo draw implies that wages are rebargained for incumbent workers the wage does not a¤ect separations in the model and we thus identify the second-stage IV coe¢ cient also in this case regardless of the …rst-stage coe¢ cient (which is close to zero given a low autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic technology shock). The calculation then weights the two cases with the Calvo probability. volatility of the job-…nding rate is slightly less than half of that of the data. This is also a problematic moment to match in the search-matching literature, as noted by Fujita and Ramey (2012) , and adding wage frictions of incumbent workers does not help in resolving this puzzle.
In the third row we turn o¤ the wage rigidity in the model and let all wages be ‡exible. This leads to complete deterioration of the models ability to match any of the moments. Essentially, the model turns to a model of exogenous separations when turning o¤ the wage rigidities, since only negative shocks large enough to eradicate the surplus of a match lead to a separation. Since these large shocks are rare, separations become almost constant. Thus the empirically relevant degree of wage rigidities carries substantial propagation force.
Note that Fujita and Ramey (2012) reports that a model with endogenous separations and fully ‡exible wages for all workers takes the volatility about halfway towards realistic values. In the fourth row we recalibrate the model with ‡exible wages to match the moments discussed above. Since the model and calibration then becomes very similar to the model of Fujita and Ramey (2012) (2008) approach, where the value of unemployment is calibrated very closely to …rm productivity and worker bargaining power is set close to zero, which achieves the same goal.
Next we study the business-cycle correlations of the model, the bottom panel of Table 4 reports correlations between labor productivity and variables discussed above. The model with wage frictions for incumbent workers matches this correlation well for unemployment, vacancies and tightness. In contrast, the recalibrated ‡exible wage model only matches the correlation between labor productivity and vacancies well. For separations, the model with wage frictions reproduces the countercyclicality of separations pointed out by Fujita and Ramey (2012) , although the correlation is somewhat on the low side. For the model with wage frictions turned o¤, but with the same parameter calibration as for the model with wage frictions, the correlation is about zero. Thus, reducing wage frictions lowers separation volatility and its comovement with productivity as expected. When the ‡exible wage model is recalibrated though, implying a much higher idiosyncratic shock variance, the correlation is close to minus unity. For the job …nding rate, the correlation is substantially higher than in the data for all models. All in all, the model with wage frictions matches the correlation with labor productivity better than the ‡exible wage case.
Turning to the elasticity of wages with respect to aggregate productivity, the implications from the model with wage rigidities for incumbent workers are close to empirical estimates. Combining the U.S. evidence reported by Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2013) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) , the overall wage elasticity across all workers with respect to aggregate productivity is reported to lie between 0:24 and 0:45 across speci…cations and data sets. The former paper also report a wage elasticity from new hires with respect to aggregate productivity in between 0:79 and 0:83. The corresponding elasticities predicted by the model is 0:47 and 0:83, respectively, which is well in line with the empirical evidence. Unsurprisingly, removing the wage frictions of incumbent workers increases both the overall and the new hires wage elasticity with respect to aggregate productivity to close to unity (0:94 in both cases). 23 As a …nal exercise to evaluate the performance of the calibrated model with wage frictions for incumbent workers, we have calculated the unemployment volatility decomposition of Barnichon (2012) . 24 We …nd that separations account for 34:4 percent of the unemployment volatility. This should be compared to the results reported in Barnichon (2012) where separations account for about 40 percent of unemployment volatility. Thus, the model results presented above are not driven by an empirically unrealistically high role of separations.
Concluding Discussion
In this paper we return to the question of whether or not wage rigidities for incumbent workers a¤ect macroeconomic outcomes. By extending Pissarides (2009) Thus, all in all, it seems that the degree of wage rigidity for newly hired workers is not a su¢ cient statistic for determining the e¤ect of wage rigidities on macroeconomic outcomes. Instead, wage frictions for incumbent workers turn out to have large e¤ects on unemployment volatility, despite wages for new hires being ‡exible. This …nding, in turn, a¤ects the interpretation of a large empirical literature on wage rigidities.
A Appendix: Robustness of Empirical Results
This appendix addresses the robustness of the micro-econometric evidence. In Table 5 we present the …rst-stage results corresponding to the baseline results presented in column (1) of Table 1 . As can be seen in both columns, the instruments are strongly relevant with F statistics of 589 and 437, respectively. Also, a formal under-identi…cation test con…rms that the baseline IV speci…cation is well identi…ed (Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM statistic: 2 (1) = 465, p-val = 0:000). Moreover, as expected under wage and price stickiness there is a strong positive relationship for each respective "own lag".
In Table 6 we perform various robustness exercises on our baseline results replicated in column
(1) for convenience. In column (2) of Table 6 we …rst focus only on the manufacturing sector. As can be seen in the table, this does not change the results qualitatively. In column (3) we increase the employment requirement to 20 full-time employees and …nd qualitatively the same results as in the base-line speci…cation in column (2). In column (4) of Table 6 , we use a much looser de…nition of employment when computing separations, using all employment spells of all workers regardless of their degree of …rm attachment. This means that a worker is counted as employed regardless of the (monthly) wage or the timing or length of the spell within a year. Again, the results are qualitatively unchanged. In the …nal column of Table 6 we lag the instrument one additional time period. As can be seen in column (5) this increase the parameter estimate on the wage slightly, as expected from the discussion in the main text, but does not change the results qualitatively. 
B.2 The Algorithm
Since the system (16), (17), (20), (21), (24) and (27) above does not depend directly on unemployment, we can solve without using unemployment as a state variable. Now, for clarity, we do not surpress the dependence of wages, surpluses and labor market tightness on aggregate productivity. Then, since the values of newly created …rms and newly hired workers depend on current and future productivities only (through future surpluses, tightness and H e ), the current wage depends only on the current productivities and tightness depends only on aggregate productivity. Hence, w i t is a function of z t and a t only. Then, for …rm-worker pairs that did not reset their wage today, the wage depends on the productivity when the wage was last reset, sayẑ andâ. We then writeŵ (ẑ;â). Then worker surpluses are H i (z t ; a t ) = w i (z t ; a t ) b I t + E t
We can proceed similarly for the remaining value equations so that surpluses when wages are reset depend on current productivity only and surpluses when wages are not rebargained depend on productivity at the last rebargain together with the current productivity.
We solve by …xing a solution for the wage, surpluses and tightness and then use value function iteration to …nd revised surpluses, wages and tightness. Given convergence of the value function iteration, we can then proceed to compute employment, unemployment, vacancies and separations.
B.3 Appendix: Swedish Calibration
In the Swedish calibration the parameters , ', a and b are set to the same values as in the U.S.
calibration, see Table 8 in the main text. Following the estimates from Swedish data presented in Adlolfsson, Laseen, Linde, and Villani (2008) , we set the Calvo probability of wage adjustment to 0:091 on a monthly basis. The parameters , c, G , , and s are set matching the same moments as for the US calibration; see Table 9 for details. Table 9 gives the moments in data and in the model that results when calibrating the parameters , c, G , , and s.
Although the Swedish labor markets ‡ows are clearly lower than in the U.S., the …t between the simulated moments and the data moments is high, and in fact slightly better than for the U.S.
calibration. In Table 10 , the moments for unemployment, the job …nding rate, the separation rate, vacancies and the vacancy/unemployment rate are illustrated. Again the model performs very well when it comes to the volatility of unemployment, vacancies and tightness. Although, as for the U.S.
the model volatility of the job-…nding rate is substantially lower than in the data. With respect to the business-cycle correlations, the performance is slightly below that of the U.S. calibration, but the overall conclusions is una¤ected. Note: The sample period for data is 2005Q3-2016:Q4. The targets for separations, the job-to-job transition rate and the job …nding rate are from the quarterly series provided by the Labor Force Survey (AKU), The series for v/u is computed using monthly data provided by the Labor Force Survey (AKU) and the Unemployment Board Statistics, respectively. To compute the persistence and standard deviation for separations, we take logs and HP …lter the series for separations with a penalty parameter of 1,600. Note: All variables are logged and HP-…ltered with a penalty parameter equal to 1,600. The sample period for data is 2005Q3-2016:Q4. Unemployment and vacancies is quarterly averages of monthly data from the Labor Force surveys and the Unemployment Board Statistics, respectively. The job …nding and separation rates are constructed from quarterly series provided by the Labor Force Survey (AKU), SCB. Labor productivity is from the National Accounts and on a quarterly frequency.
